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Who decides 
whether a patient 
lives or dies? 
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or prefer to forgo it, 
they and their families 
sometimes clash with 
health care providers. 
In resolving these 
disputes, courts are 
facing tough questions 
of life and death. 
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E ighty-year-old Mary Wohlford had strong views about life-sustaining medical treatment 
(LSMT). When the time came for her 
to die, she did not want interventions to 
interrupt the dying process. She com-
municated her wishes as clearly and 
bluntly as she could imagine: with a tat-
too on her chest that read, "DO NOT 
RESUSCITATE."' 
Although few people go as far as 
Wohlford to express their wishes, many 
share similar feelings about the use of re-
suscitation techniques, ventilators, feed-
ing tubes, and other life-sustaining meas-
ures when death is approaching. Others, 
of course, have precisely the opposite 
preference and want whatever inter-
ventions modem medicine can devise to 
try to extend life. Either way, patient 
preferences about end-of-life care can 
be frustrated by health care providers. 
When this happens, patients or their 
families may seek legal representation. 
If the dispute over care is ongoing, the 
remedy sought may be an injunction re-
quiring compliance with the patient's 
wishes. If unwanted interventions have 
already occurred, or if requested inter-
ventions have already been withheld, the 
patient, or others on his or her behalf, 
may seek damages. 
The legal basis for claims against 
health care providers in these contexts 
is the right of informed consent. Arising 
out of "our Anglo-American legal tradi-
tion of personal autonomy," this com-
mon law principle vests in a competent 
patient "the right of self-determination" 
about proposed invasions of the body.' 
Informed consent to treatment implies 
a "logical corollary" that the patient gen-
erally possesses "the right not to consent, 
that is, to refuse treatrnent."3 
The right of informed consent or re-
fusal applies whether the treatment in 
question is aimed at curing a condition 
or at maintaining vital functions when a 
disease cannot be cured. For example, 
a patient with end-stage renal disease 
may accept dialysis or decline it. The fact 
that the consequence of declining is 
likely to be death underscores the need 
for a careful informed consent process, 
but it does not remove the decision 
from the patient.< 
Patients who lack the capacity to en-
gage in the informed consent process, 
however, present special challenges. 
Many people nearing the end of life 
have impairments from the terminal ill-
ness itself or from secondary disorders, 
such as clinical depression. Sometimes, 
decisional incapacity results from med-
ical treatments (for example, the seda-
tive effect of strong analgesics) or even 
the medical environment (for example, 
"ICU psychosis," in which acute-care pa-
tients develop a syndrome involving im-
paired intellectual functioning"). What-
ever the cause, decisional incapacity 
threatens the control over end-of-life 
interventions that the informed con-
sent doctrine seeks to ensure. 
While decisional incapacity theoreti-
cally does not negate the patient's un-
derlying right," it does mean that the is-
sue of end-of-life interventions must be 
addressed differently. When the patient 
is incapacitated, the physician must con-
duct the informed consent process with 
a proxy decision-maker who has the re-
sponsibilityto decide on the patient's be-
half, sometimes with the aid of a living 
will or similar advance medical directive. 
State law defines the circumstances un-
der which a living will may be used to de-
termine preferences about end-of-life 
care after a patient's loss of capacity. State 
law also secures a patient's right to iden-
tify a preferred proxy and, in most states, 
establishes next-of-kin decision-making 
authoritywithoutresort to guardianship. 
Unwanted treatn~ent 
Most disagreements about the care of 
a dying patient are resolved without re-
sort to the courts.7 Nevertheless, from 
perhaps the earliest end-of-life case, In 
re Quinlan,8 courts have issued declara-
tory or injunctive relief against health 
care providers who refuse to carry out a 
decision to forgo further use of LSMT. 
Of course, this decision must be based 
on sufficient evidence thatitreflects the 
patient's wishes or promotes the pa-
tient's best interest. If such evidence is 
presented, courts give practical effect to 
the informed consent doctrine by or-
dering the treatment stopped.9 
Much more problematic, from a 
plaintiff's perspective, is obtaining dam-
ages after the fact. For example, in An-
derson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital, a 
nurse successfully resuscitated a patient, 
despite a "do not resuscitate" (DNR) or-
der issued at the patient's request. 10 Two 
days later, the patient suffered a stroke, 
leaving him partially paralyzed. He sued 
the hospital for negligence and battery. 
The Ohio court readily acknowl-
edged the legal wrong: ''Whether inten-
tional or negligent, interference with a 
person's legal right to die would consti-
tute a breach of that duty to honor the 
wishes of the patient. "ll Nevertheless, 
the claims failed. Disceming no evi-
dence that the resuscitation was negli-
gently performed or was itself the cause 
of the stroke, the court ruled that the 
negligence claim amounted to one for 
"wrongful living," an unacceptable at-
tempt to win damages for the ills of life 
that followed the successful resuscita-
tion. 12 On the battery claim, because the 
resuscitation was physically harmless (in-
volving no broken bones or other in-
juries, as sometimes occurs), only nom-
inal damages were possible and had not 
been sought by the plaintiff. 
This case illustrates a fundamental 
problem with the right to decline life-
sustaining treatment Although the legal 
right is well-established and generally can 
be translated into an injunction requir-
ing health care providers to comply with 
a refusal, tort law is a doubtful means of 
redress when unwanted life-sustaining 
treatment has already been adminis-
tered. Depending on the facts, the ele-
ments of battery, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, or negligence 
Other cases illustrate how the path to 
recovery can be blocked. In lFright v. 
johns Hopkins Health Systems Corp., an 
AIDS patient signed a living >vill direct-
ing health care prmiders to forgo LSMT. 
including resuscitation efforts, after two 
physicians had certified that he was in a 
terminal condition. 1' While in the hos-
pital to get a blood transfusion, the pa-
tient suffered cardiac arrest. He was re-
suscitated and died 10 davs later. His 
family's negligence claim for violation of 
the living will was defeated because, al-
though they argued that he was in a ter-
The fact that the consequence of declining dialysis 
is likely to be death underscores the need for a 
careful informed consent process, but it does not 
remove the decision from the patient. 
might appear to be satisfied. Yet, as one 
leading treatise observes, "Despite the 
apparent ease of stating a ... claim, the 
courts display extreme reluctance tope-
nalize health care providers for render-
ing life-sustaining treatment to patients 
even if the patients did notwantit."13 
Courts are wary of determining that 
a person's life was "unnecessarily pro-
longed," as an Indiana court put it, and 
translating the extended life into dam-
ages. In Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Muncie 
Medical Investors, L.P,14 the patient's liv-
ing will rejected "extraordinary means" 
to prolong her life once she was in a ter-
minal condition. 15 Her family under-
stood the document to mean no use of a 
feeding tube, which a nursing home nev-
ertheless inserted. After the patient 
died, her family brought both negli-
gence and intentional tort claims. 
Affirming the trial court's grant of 
summary judgrnentforthe defendants, 
the appellate court held that "the family 
could have challenged the actions of 
[the patient's] physicians ... in court at 
any time to enforce their decisions re-
garding [the patient's] care."16 That, 
however, was their only remedy, because 
the court declined to recognize what it 
called "a new cause of action for wrong-
ful prolongation of life."17 
minal condition following the cardiac 
arrest, two physicians had not certified 
this, and so the living will did not apply. 
InAllore v.Flower Hospital, the patient, 
who suffered from asbestosis, executed 
a living will declining life-sustaining 
treatment when he was admitted to the 
hospital in june 1994. Two months later, 
he was readmitted and, during an 
episode of respiratory distress, was in-
tubated and placed on a respirator. After 
he died, his family's battery claim for vi-
olation of the living will failed because, 
although the patient's primary physi-
cian knew of the living will, those who 
performed the resuscitation did not. 19 
Blouin v. Spitzer, a New York case, in-
volved a claim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress against state law-
yers who had insisted on medically con-
traindicated and physically harmful ar-
tificial feeding?0 
The patient, with serious mental and 
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physical impairments since infancy, was 
near death in a state university hospital. 
By agreement of the family and the 
treatment team, interventions to pro-
long life were forgone in favor of pallia-
tive care, which succeeded in keeping 
the patient comfortable. However, 
lawyers from the attomey general's of-
fice, asserting that only a competent pa-
tient could lawfully decline artificial nu-
trition and hydration, insisted that the 
patient be given an intravenous nutri-
tion solution. Mter more than a month 
of this treatment, which the patient's 
continued life-saving treatment would 
be "medicallyinappropriate" or"futile." 
These cases highlight tensions between 
the authority of patients and their sur-
rogates to obtain wanted care and the 
domain of physicians to determine what 
types of care are medically appropriate. 
A few have resulted in litigation. 
In cases brought for failure to pro-
vide LSMT consistent with patient or 
proxy wishes, the patient is typically se-
verely disabled and very close to death. 
In the few cases that have been brought, 
plaintiffs have sought recovery based 
Although the legal right to refuse treatment is well 
established, tort law is a doubtful means of redress 
when unwanted life-sustaining treatment has 
already been administered. 
physicians noted was worsening her con-
dition and causing increased suffering, 
a court (over the attorney general's of-
fice's opposition) authorizedaretum to 
the original palliative-care plan despite 
the evident harm to the patient. 
The case was dismissed because the 
lawyers had not acted "beyond all pos-
sible bounds of decency," a nearly in-
surmountable standard!' The lawyers 
were also protected by public-official 
immunity. Similarly, a Califomia court 
broadly construed a statutory immuni-
ty provision to shield from damages 
health care providers who kept a pa-
tient alive against family requests to 
withdraw life support. ~2 
In short, although physicians may 
fear liability for tort claims of this kind 
and some settlements have been re-
ported,'3 the odds are against a sub-
stantial recovery. 
D'eatment withheld 
While physicians often err on the side 
of providing LSMT, even when it is 
against a patient's wishes, in some cases 
they have terminated life support de-
spite a request from the patient's family 
members that doctors do everything 
possible to keep the patient alive. In 
those cases, physicians often believe that 
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on theories of negligent or intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, lack of 
informed consent, or failure to treat un-
der two federal statutes: the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor 
Act (EMTALA)24 and the Rehabilita-
tionActof 1973.25 The first two types of 
claims may be viable, but so far, courts 
have rejected the statutory claims when 
brought to obtain damages. 
Emotional distress. In Rideout v. Her-
shey Medical Center, the parents of two-
year-old Brianne Rideout, who suffered 
from a brain-stem tumor, sued the hos-
pital where Brianne was removed from 
a ventilatorwithout their consent."' Her 
physicians believed that she would not 
survive the tumor and that the ventila-
tor was prolonging her death. Even so, 
her parents favored aggressive chemo-
therapy treatment. 
Brianne's attending physician, with 
the support of the hospital's ethics com-
mittee, wrote aDNRorderwithout the 
parents' consent. The Rideouts were 
told that in the event of cardiac arrest, 
Brianne would not be resuscitated but 
that "no support would be withdrawn. "27 
Brianne remained in the hospital for 
weeks, and her parents were told that 
their health insurance coverage "might 
soon be exhausted and that medical as-
sistance would be needed to cover her 
medical costs."'" Since Brianne was sta-
ble, the hospital sought to place her in 
home care or a chronic-care facility; 
however, there was no placement avail-
able at the time and none likely to be 
available for several months. 
Mter Brianne had been in the hospi-
tal for more than three months, her con-
dition deteriorated significantly. Her at-
tending physician felt that continued 
LSMT was futile and inappropriate. 
Without the Rideouts' consent, he shut 
off Brianne's ventilator. 
At the time, her parents were in the of-
fice of the hospital's patient advocate, 
hoping to prevent or stall the physician's 
actions. They heard the hospital's chap-
lain, who was in Brianne's room, an-
nounce over the hospital's intercom: 
"They tumed her off, they tumed her 
of£1" They rushed to Brianne's bedside 
"hysterically crying and screaming that 
their child had been murdered."2'J Bri-
anne's father was so upset "that he suf-
fered an acute asthma attack." Despite 
being disconnected from the ventilator, 
Brianne was able to breathe on her own. 
However, two days later, unable to get 
enough oxygen, she "succumbed to car-
diopulmonary failure and died in the 
presence of her parents.""" 
The Rideouts sued the hospital, al-
leging, among other things, negligent 
and intentional infliction of emotion-
al distress. The hospital asserted that 
they could not satisfy the elements of 
each claim under Pennsylvania com-
mon law or the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, but the court determined that the 
Rideouts did sufficiently allege claims 
for both torts. 
Another case alleging intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, Estate of 
Bland v. Cigna Healthplan of Texas, in-
volved an AIDS patient who died after he 
was taken off a respirator against his wish-
es. Family members sued his health care 
providers and the chair of the hospital's 
ethics committee." The suit was settled, 
and it is not clear whether the family 
would have prevailed if the case had gone 
to trial. However, several facts appeared 
to make the actions of the health care 
providers particularly egregious. 
Bland, a registered nurse who was 
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close to death, was admitted to a Houston 
hospital's ICU. At the hospital, he was 
placed on a respirator and given a para-
lytic drug to make him comfortable. Be-
cause he was afraid of suffocating if he 
was taken off the respirator, "he asked his 
physician to allow him to die peacefully 
while being ventilated."32 His family 
agreed toaDNRorderon the condition 
that Bland be kept on the respirator. 
Bland's primary care physician, who 
was part of a Cigna managed care plan, 
questioned whether he needed to re-
main in the ICU. Allegedly in response 
which the Fourth Circuit had held that 
EMTAIArequiredahospital to provide 
ventilatory support to an infant with 
anencephaly when the infant was 
brought to the hospital's emergency 
room, despite the hospital's view that 
"such treatment was unethical and in-
appropriate."36 The Rideout court held 
that Brianne had received "appropriate 
medical screening, and her emergency 
medical condition was properly stabi-
lized for approximately three months."37 
In addition, the court found that be-
cause of her condition, discharge or 
Few courts have specifically addressed the issue of 
futility of medical treatment, and those that have 
considered it have reached inconsistent conclusions. 
to these concerns, the hospital's ethics 
committee chair intervened without 
consulting Bland's family, and "the pa-
tient was removed from the respirator 
by a respiratory therapist and died 
shortly thereafter."33 
Informed consent. In addition to 
emotional distress claims, the Rideout 
plaintiffs brought a series of claims based 
on lack of informed consent. They were 
grounded in common law as well as con-
stitutional provisions because the defen-
dant was a state institution. Regarding 
the common law claim, the court relied 
on Pennsylvania case law holding that 
"where a surgical procedure is per-
formed upon an incompetent, the physi-
cian must obtain consent byway of the 
pa:tient's surrogate."34 The court gave 
little weight to the hospital's argument 
that removal of the ventilator was not a 
surgical procedure and concluded that 
it was premature to dismiss the claim. 
Statutory claims. Although the Ride-
outs' emotional distress and informed 
consent claims survived summary 
judgment, their case shows the obsta-
cles facing claims based on violations 
of EMTAIAorthe Rehabilitation Act. 
The court determined that the hospi-
tal had not violated EMTALA by discon-
tinuing Brianne's ventilator. It distin-
guished the case from In re Baby K," in 
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transfer from the hospital was unlikely. 
Finally, the court determined that the 
facts of the case did not support a claim 
alleging violation of the Rehabilitation 
Act. To be successful under §504 of the 
act, a plaintiff must show that a person 
with a disability is "otherwise qualified" 
for the benefitsoughtand that he or she 
was discriminated against solely because 
of the disability. Brianne, the court de-
termined, "was not' otherwise qualified' 
to receive mechanical ventilatory sup-
port absent her disabling condition 
since that condition (brain-stem cancer) 
was related to the condition to be treat-
ed (lack of oxygen) ."38 
In another unsuccessful EMTAIA 
case,Bryan v.Rectors &Visitors of the Uni-
versity of Virginia, Cindy Bryan brought 
suit against the university on behalf of 
Shirley Robertson, a 53-year-old patient 
who was transferred to the university hos-
pital after surgery at a regional hospital 
to treat an ulcer. 39 Her condition after 
surgery was very poor, and a CTscan "re-
vealed a massive left cerebrovascular 
stroke. In addition, her multiple infec-
tions were not responsive to antibiotics, 
and she had massive subcutaneous em-
physema and kidney failure. "40 
AI though her family asked her health 
care providers to do everything possible 
to keep her alive, including administer-
ing CPR in the event of cardiac arrest, 
her doctors determined that CPR would 
be "ethically and medically inappropri-
ate." Mter consultation with members of 
the hospital's ethics committee and sev-
eral other physicians not involved in the 
case, the attending physician wrote a 
DNR order. Eight days later, Robertson 
had a heart attack and died. 
The plaintiff argued that under 
EMTAIA the hospital had an obligation 
not only "to admit Mrs. Robertson for 
treatment of her emergency condi-
tion" -respiratorydistress-"but there-
aftercontinuouslyto 'stabilize' her con-
dition no matter how long treatment was 
required to maintain that condition. "41 
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding 
that "EMTALAseeks to achieve the lim-
ited purpose of its enactment by requir-
ing that the hospital provide limited sta-
bilizing treatment to or an appropriate 
transfer of any patient that arrives with 
an emergency condition" and that the 
stabilizing requirement does not apply 
in the context of the patient's long-term 
care in the facility. 42 
Intentional tort. In at least two cases, 
plaintiffs have characterized the wrong 
as an intentional tort and argued that 
the claim was not subject to the state's 
procedural requirements under its 
medical malpractice statute. The courts 
in both cases disagreed. 
In Causey v. St. Francis Medical Center, 
the family of a 31-year-old comatose, 
quadriplegic patient in end-stage renal 
failure sued the hospital and the pa-
tient's physician for intentional battery 
after the physician withdrew the pa-
tient's LSMT against the family's wish-
es.43 The Louisiana Court of Appeal af-
firmed the trial court's decision that 
withdrawal of medical treatment with-
out consent requires a determination 
of the relevant standard of medical 
care. As a result, the court said, the 
claim falls under the state's Medical 
Malpractice Act and should have been 
submitted to a medical review panel be-
fore being filed in court. 
Similarly, in Litz v. Robinson, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's 
claim of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress for wrongful withholding 
of life-saving treatment was, in essence, 
a medical malpractice claim. Therefore, 
it had to comply with the state's require-
ments for malpractice actions, including 
the production of expert testimony." 
The question of futility 
In each of these cases, the health 
care provider's general defense is that 
the demanded medical treatment 
would have been medically inappro-
priate or futile. Few courts have specif-
ically addressed the issue of futility, 
and those that have considered it have 
reached inconsistent conclusions. 
In Causey, the court examined the 
concept of futility in some detail, distin-
guishing between care that is medically 
or physiologically futile and care that is 
futile on "philosophical, religious, or 
practical grounds. "45 The court asserted 
that"futilityis a subjective and nebulous 
concept which, except in the strictest 
physiological sense, incorporates value 
judgments. "46 To focus on a definition of 
"futility," it said, "is confusing and gen-
erates polemical discussions." As a result, 
the court characterized the issue as one 
of the appropriate standard of care; it 
went on to say that a physician has no o b-
ligation to "provide interventions that in 
his view would be harmful, without ef-
fect, or 'medically inappropriate. "'47 
In Gilgunn v. Massachusetts General 
Hospita~ a jury rejected claims by Cather-
ine Gilgunn's daughter, Joan, that the 
hospital and two of its physicians were 
guilty of negligence and infliction of 
emotional distress. 48 Catherine was a 71-
year-old comatose patient with multiple 
health problems and extensive brain 
damage from a series of seizures. De-
spite her daughter's claims that Cather-
ine had said she wanted everything done 
to keep her alive, her physicians wrote a 
DNR order asserting that CPR in her 
case would be "medically contraindicat-
ed, inhumane, and unethical."49 The 
jury agreed with the physicians. 
In these cases, health care providers 
allege that "doctors are not required to 
provide a treatment simply because it is 
demanded by patients or their surro-
gates."50 On the other hand, patients and 
their advocates argue that these cases are 
about "how society protects its most vul-
nerable members and how it decides 
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which lives are worth preserving.""' 
It is not hard to understand why 
judges might be uneasv deciding these 
life-and-death matters, especially given 
the lack of consensus on the definition 
of "futile" medical treatment and a 
process for determining it. There is also 
an unstated concern that health care 
costs are driving these decisions.''' In 
both Rideout and Bland, for example, it 
is unclear whether the termination of 
life support was motivated by cost con-
cerns or by the patient's status. 
This confusion may rightly give judg-
es pause, and some may decide that the 
validity of a "futility defense" is a matter 
that should be addressed by the legisla-
ture rather than the judiciary. At least 
one state government has attempted to 
help judges in this regard. In 2003, the 
Texas legislature added a provision to its 
advance directive law that requires re-
view by an ethics or medical committee 
when an attending physician refuses to 
complywith a patient'sorsurrogate'sre-
quest for LSMT because the doctor be-
lieves the treatment would be medically 
inappropriate. If the committee agrees 
with the physician, the patient must be 
given LSMT while efforts are made to 
transfer the patient to a willing pro-
vider.53 If a willing provider cannot be 
found within 10 days of the committee 
decision, the treatment may be with-
drawn or withheld unless a court has 
granted an extension. 
The statute provides a framework for 
resolving these disputes outside the 
courtroom, although it has not prevent-
ed litigation. 54 
Plaintiffs who seek damages for the 
harm of unwanted LSMT are largely 
fighting an uphill battle. Courts have 
reaffirmed the right to refuse this treat-
ment, but generally they perceive a 
damages remedy as a "wrongful living" 
claim, which they are unwilling to en-
dorse. Plaintiffs who seek damages for 
the withholding or withdrawal of re-
quested life-saving treatment may fare 
better, especially where the facts indi-
cate egregious conduct by hospital per-
sonnel or where there is some indica-
tion that a hospital is motivated by cost 
concerns-but they face uncertainty 
when health care providers defend 
their action on futility grounds. 
Plaintiffs are more likely to achieve 
their goals in futility cases if they seek 
a remedy before life support is termi-
nated. Courts may be more willing to 
order the provision of care consistent 
with a patient's wishes when he or she 
is still alive than to award damages after 
a patient has died. • 
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